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Abstract 
Personal intelligence involves the capacity to reason about personality and personality-related 
information. In Study 1 (N = 10,318), we conduct an item-level analysis of the Test of Personal 
Intelligence (TOPI) to explore people’s problem-solving abilities in the area. Personal 
intelligence divided into Consistency and Dynamic Reasoning factors, a finding we cross-
validated in Study 2 (N = 8,459). In Study 3 (N = 384), we reanalyzed previously-collected data 
to examine correlates of the two factors. Studying personal intelligence with ability-based 
measures of the concept creates a virtuous cycle of better measurement and better understanding 
of the ability. 
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A Closer Look at the Test of Personal Intelligence, Version 1.4  
 
Personal intelligence is a recently-described mental ability that involves the capacity to 
reason about personality and personality-related information. According to the theory, people 
employ their knowledge of personality to understand both themselves and the personalities of 
others (Mayer, 2008). More specifically, people use their personal intelligence to solve problems 
in four areas: They (a) recognize personality-relevant information in themselves and others, 
“reading” people’s traits. They (b) use such information to form models of people’s personalities 
so as to understand themselves and others; they (c) guide their own and others’ choices making 
use of personality-relevant information to choose goals consistent with their interests and values. 
And lastly, they (d) systematize their goals and plans to to enhance the likelihood of achieving 
their aims (Mayer, 2008). Personal intelligence also has a foundation in our human heritage: 
Among our evolutionary ancestors, those who could better understand themselves and the people 
around them likely experienced adaptive advantages relative to others (cf., Buss, 2008; Dunbar, 
2009). 
Personality can be characterized as “the specific mental organization and processes that 
produce an individual’s characteristic patterns of behavior and experience” (DeYoung, 2015, p. 
33). The personality system manages mental processes such as an individual’s motives and 
emotions, knowledge and intelligences, and awareness and self-control (DeYoung, 2015; Larsen 
& Buss, 2014; Von Bertalanffy, 1951). Personal intelligence enhances the self-guidance of 
personality by allowing for reasoning both about one’s own personality and the personalities of 
others (Mayer, 2014). 
Certain often-studied intelligences of today, including quantitative and spatial 
intelligences, emphasize reasoning about aspects of things: the manipulation of numbers, or the 
rotation of objects in space; these intelligences are sometimes referred to as “cool” because they 
are relatively impersonal in the topics they concern (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2016). Other 
intelligences emphasize reasoning about aspects of people, such as—in the case of emotional 
intelligence measured as an ability—reasoning specifically about their emotions; these are 
sometimes referred to as “hot” because they often concern matters of personal concern. Personal 
intelligence is a further example of a person-focused intelligence, differing from emotional 
intelligence in that it concerns a far wider range of reasoning than specifically emotion-centered 
problem-solving (Mayer et al., 2016).  
To explore whether personal intelligence existed and could be objectively measured, the 
present authors developed a Test of Personal Intelligence (TOPI) that consisted of four broad 
areas of questions that corresponded to the four areas of problem solving described by the theory, 
and that yielded scores keyed to each of those areas. The initial studies of the TOPI indicated that 
ability-based items about personality could be written, correct answers identified, and that people 
exhibited reliable individual differences in their reasoning capacities in the area (Mayer, Panter, 
& Caruso, 2012). The TOPI exhibited promising relationships with other variables as well: 
Personal intelligence exhibits moderate relations with measures of verbal, quantitative and 
spatial intelligences in the r = .17 to .30 range (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, in press), and correlates 
about r = .65 with strategic emotional intelligence (i.e., understanding and managing emotions). 
Among the Big Five personality traits, it correlates with self-reported openness-closedness at 
approximately r = .15 (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, in press; Mayer et al., 2012). Finally, the 
intelligence predicts consequential academic and performance outcomes incrementally above 
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measures of general intelligence  (g) alone, suggesting its practical usefulness in high-stakes 
testing (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, in press). 
The first confirmatory factor model of the TOPI employed scores keyed to the four 
problem-solving areas of the TOPI, and indicated that personal intelligence could be regarded as 
a single, unitary ability. At the same time, the four test sections overlapped more in content than 
was optimal for indicators of the construct. That initial confirmatory factor model “represented 
an…imperfect, first representation of the results,” that would require follow-up (Mayer et al., 
2012, p. 136). The first look at the TOPI was, in a sense, a promissory note: Surely more could 
be learned about the structure of abilities in the area.  
In this article, we provide an itemized payment on that promissory note in the form of an 
item-level reanalysis of the TOPI to better answer, among other questions, what abilities people 
bring to bear when problem-solving in the area. We regard any such abilities as likely to be 
distinct from the four content areas of problem solving questions (Mayer et al., 2016). As an 
analogy, people who study literature learn to understand both fiction and nonfiction. However, 
their ability to understand those texts draws on mental abilities that divide differently from the 
subject matter: Both kinds of texts require abilities in vocabulary skill and sentence 
comprehension. Identifying the specific abilities of personal intelligence is important to 
describing what the reasoning involves and providing education in the area. 
A second purpose of the study is to learn more about how people’s abilities in personal 
intelligence are distributed across samples and the population. General intelligence is often 
considered to be normally distributed. As nutrition improves worldwide and positive cognitive 
stimulation increases, there is some evidence that general intelligence is becoming more 
negatively skewed (i.e., the majority of people score better), but the shape still is predominantly 
normal (e.g., Colom, Lluis-Font, & Andrés-Pueyo, 2005).  
There is, however, a suggestion that the distribution for intelligences focused on people is 
considerably different (cf., Maul, 2012). This is theoretically important because it may reflect 
that at the high end of reasoning about people there are, in fact, few reliable rules by which to 
judge people and to predict their behaviors past a certain level of complexity. At the lower end of 
the distribution, a negatively-skewed tail of the intelligences may also reflect the existence of 
biopsychological conditions such as Autism-spectrum disorders (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001).  
Finally, we examine the TOPI in relation to self-estimated personal intelligence, showing 
that ability in personal intelligence and self-judgment are distinct constructs, and we will 
examine a newly revised test in relation to its earlier versions—re-computing relationships 
between new test scales and earlier-studied criteria.   
Studying a concept together with the way it is measured creates a virtuous cycle of better 
measurement and better understanding of the construct (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van 
Heerden, 2004; Hood, 2009; O'Sullivan, 2007). Test subscales are better justified when they are 
based on the actual structure of abilities measured by the test (Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 2010; 
Sinharay, Puhan, & Haberman, 2011). Moreover, understanding the abilities people use to solve 
problems in the domain can be helpful to providing education in an area. 
  
The TOPI Series of Tests 
 
General Overview of the TOPI Tests 
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The Test of Personal Intelligence (TOPI) was introduced in 2012 to help determine the 
existence of a personal intelligence; evidence accrued for the construct as the scale underwent 
several revisions from versions from 1.0 to 1.2 (Mayer et al., 2012). The present version, 1.4. is a 
93-item subset of the TOPI 1.2 (Mayer, Panter, & Caruso, 2014). Most key characteristics of the 
TOPI have remained the same over forms: The test is divided into four areas of problem solving, 
reflecting the four problem-solving areas of the theory, from “Recognizing Information,” to 
“Systematizing Plans.”  
The four problem solving areas of the TOPI 1.4 are overall divided into 13 clusters of 
more specific test items. Items in each cluster have a similar format to one another. Across the 
test, all items are multiple choice and each one has four alternatives. For example, the 
Recognizing Information area includes a “Recognizing inner motives” cluster, in which test-
takers are asked to assess a person’s wants and needs and, from those, forecast a likely 
behavioral pattern. The first item of that group asks: 
1. If a person wants to be with one or more people, talk to them, go out with them, and 
have a good time, the person is likely going to: 
a. be in love 
b. express warmth toward someone 
c. meet a goal of excellence 
d. socialize 
The test-taker who answers this item correctly must assess the given behaviors of being with 
people, going out with them, and consequent enjoyment, and extract from them the motive most 
likely to have directed a person: in this case the need to socialize (alternative “d”). The logic 
required for each task is different. For example, a cluster in the Systematizing Plans area 
includes items that ask whether test-takers can recognize goals that conflict (“Problematic 
goals”); see Mayer et al. (2012) for examples of items from each section of the test. 
The TOPI’s coverage of the areas helps ensure both that all included test questions have 
to do with key aspects of personal intelligence and that a broad range of relevant content areas 
are sampled, providing evidence for its appropriate coverage of content as recommended in the 
Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (Joint_Committee, 2014).  
Veridical Scoring and Item Difficulty 
Correct answers to the TOPI are scored correct (1 point) or incorrect (0 points). Correct 
answers were identified with reference to relevant published research in the field of personality 
psychology based on generally-agreed upon phenomena in personality psychology. Personality 
research is complex and does not always lead to a consensus; the most agreed-upon findings are 
those that often are widely known, making for relatively easy test items. The trade-off, however, 
was the relative confidence that we were measuring valid knowledge of personality as opposed 
to, say, agreement with one theorist or theoretical school at the expense of another.  
Self-Judged Personal Intelligence 
 People’s personal intelligence also can be assessed with self-judgment items keyed to the 
theory, and we have created such a scale with items of the form “I don’t know who I am” 
(reverse scored), and “I read people’s intentions well” (answered from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree” on a 5-point scale), called the Self-Estimated Personal Intelligence inventory 
(SEPI). Like most instruments measuring self-reported intelligence, the SEPI is likely saturated 
with construct-irrelevant variance including endorsements based on high (or low) self-esteem 
and reflecting respondents’ imperfect understanding of what good reasoning consists of. Self-
reports of intelligence generally correlate r = .20 or lower with actual assessments of mental 
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ability (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998) and we expect similar findings 
here. 
Study 1. Large Sample Data Analysis of the TOPI 1.4R  
 
Purposes and Hypotheses of the Study 
 The key purpose of the study was to identify any distinguishable abilities that make up 
personal intelligence—and should they exist—to describe such abilities, and to develop scales 
that could adequately measure those distinct areas of reasoning. We were guided in those aims 
by several hypotheses.    
 Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis provided a key foundation for the item analyses: to 
ensure that participants were paying adequate attention to the items in the second half of the test 
(the TOPI items are administered in a fixed order) given that TOPI items may place a substantial 
cognitive load on respondents. To test Hypothesis 1, we examined participants’ drop-offs in 
attention by examining their rates of endorsement of unlikely responses, as well as their overuse 
of a single letter response (long-string responding) over the length of the test. If there were a 
drop-off from the first to second halves, we further planned to screen out any participants who 
exhibited precipitous in that regard before conducting further analyses.   
Hypothesis 2: Personal intelligence can be divided into two or more correlated factors. 
Our second hypothesis was that personal intelligence could be divided into two or more 
(probably) highly correlated factors in a simple structure factor model. Given that “broad” 
intelligences such as spatial, verbal and quantitative intelligences often correlate in the range of r 
= .70 to .95, we expected that any subsidiary factors of personal intelligence would correlate 
between r = .75 to .95 as well. To estimate the practical significance of any factors beyond the 
first, we planned to estimate each factors’ explained common variance (ECV) in the context of 
an alternative bifactor model, which uniquely allows for such estimates (Reise, 2012). We 
planned to retain any factor with less than about 85% of its variance explained by the overall 
construct, consistent with contemporary practice (e.g., O'Connor Quinn, 2014). 
Hypothesis 3. Similar scale performance for men and women. We hypothesized that 
any factors obtained would be consistent across groups of both women and men (i.e., configural 
invariance). We also expected that women would score somewhat higher than men on the test as 
they do for people-centered intelligences more generally (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002) and 
that the item discrimination and difficulty levels of individual items (controlling for the overall 
difference) would be similar for women and men.  
Hypothesis 4: Better discrimination at low levels of ability. Previous research suggests 
that most people exhibit good skills at understanding one another in the realm of people-oriented, 
hot intelligences such as personal and emotional intelligences (see, for example, Fiori et al., 
2014; Mayer et al., 2016). Although most people perform well, we expect a substantial number 
of people will nonetheless exhibit poorer, low performance as indicated both by a negative skew 
among TOPI scores and the test’s more accurate discrimination of test-takers at low levels of 
ability.   
Hypothesis 5: Reliable measurement. We expected that TOPI 1.4 scales would exhibit 
reliable measurement as indicated by coefficient alpha reliabilities, reliabilities in IRT theory, 
and reasonable standard errors of measurement.  
Hypothesis 6. Uniqueness of the measure given the cognitive response process it elicits. 
We expected that scales of the TOPI 1.4 would correlate r = .10 to .20 range with a measure of 
Self-Estimated Personal Intelligence (SEPI).  







 Participants were 10,618 test-takers drawn from seven samples, mostly from the United 
States military.  The sample included 8,049 men, 2,261 women, and 6 other; the mean age of the 
sample was 21.09. Further details of the samples and procedures used to collect the data can be 
found in the footnotes to Table 1. 
 A master data file was assembled from these seven ethnically diverse samples, tested by 
the United States Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) between the fall 2012 
and June 2015. The data file began with a sample of 1,114 individuals tested at the U.S. Military 
Academy at West Point and concluded with a composite sample of individuals tested while in in 
Officer Candidate School in June 2015. We chose June 2015 as our stopping point for inclusion 
because our samples contained over 10,000 participants by then and data delivered by the 
OEMA often slowed in the summer. All participants received the TOPI 1.4 with the exception of 
Group 1 who received a version of the TOPI 1.2 that contained all the items on the TOPI 1.4.  
Measures 
Our measures included the 93-item Test of Personal Intelligence, Version 1.4 and a 16-
item scale of Self-Estimated Personal Intelligence (SEPI-16); both scales were described earlier 





 We begin by describing our process for screening participants, move to our factor 
analysis of the TOPI, an examination of two newly-formed factor-based scales using the 
techniques of item response theory, and then present statistics for the new scales we developed. 
Fall-Off in Attention and Screening Participants Based on Their Attention Levels 
(Hypothesis 1) 
All TOPI data provided by the OEMA and in the Study 1 Archive had been prescreened 
to ensure all participants’ responses were complete. Sample 6, from our laboratory, was also 
screened for complete responding, and for signs of haphazard responding (Lortie, 2015). To 
determine whether the remaining test-takers exhibited a drop-off of attention, we developed two 
scales of inattentive responding (Huang, Curran, Keeney, Poposki, & DeShon, 2012).  
The first, Infrequency, counted the number of times a participant selected the least 
endorsed, most obviously incorrect, answer for each of the 93 TOPI items among the 10,618 
respondents. Infrequency scales for the first and second halves of the test correlated r = .63. The 
second scale, Letter-Repetition, was set equal to the maximum number of times a respondent 
chose any of the four letter alternatives A, B, C, or D across items. Letter-repetition in the first 
and second halves of the test correlated r = .36. The Infrequency and Letter Repetition Scales for 
the whole test correlated r = .34.  
Attention fall-off. Both the infrequency and letter-frequency scales exhibited substantial 
positive skew, indicating that most participants were responding meaningfully throughout. When 
we employed a nonparametric one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov analysis of the mean difference 
in scales across the first- and second test halves, however, we found evidence for more 
infrequent responding and more letter repetitions during the second half of the test (ps < .0001).    
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Table 1  
 
Overview of the Original Samples of Study 1 after Data Exclusions N = 10,318 
 
 Sample size Age 
Sample Number and Descriptiona N Ns after Screening Mean Range 
 Total Total Men Women   
1. United States Military Academy Cadets, West 
Point, Class of 2014, testing by the Office of 
Economic and Manpower Analysisb  
 
1114 1106 905 201 20.98 20-30 
2. As in sample 1, Class of 2015b 
 
1048 1048 867 174 20 20-22 
3. As in sample 1, Class of 2016b 
 
972 968 807 161 20.52 20-22 
4. As in sample 1, Class of 2018b 
 
1089 1078 832 246 20.08 20-22 
5. Reserve Officer Training Core (ROTC) data testing 
by the Office of Economic and Manpower 
Analysisb 
 
5614 5390 4208 1176 20.01 20-30 
6. Mturk sample of people employed at least half-
time; screened for inattentive responding (see 
Lortie, 2015)c 
 
474 459 210 c 247 c 34.91 19-70 
7. Members of the United States Army enrolled in 
Officer Candidate School. This sample is a 
composite of 00 smaller samples tested through the 
2013-2015 timespan, also by the Office of 
Economic and Manpower Analysesb 
 
307 276 220 56 25.80 22-90 
Overall Total 10618 10318 8049d 2261d 21.09 19-90 
Note. 
a. a. Participants in all samples were required to answer every question to complete the survey.  
b. b. Members of samples 1-4, 5, and 7 were tested by proctors in large groups and took the test on a military 
survey-administration system (a few hundred cadets who missed the group testing completed it individually). All 
individuals in the military samples were told that their scores on the test were consequential because the test 
scores would be used by the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis to help them choose the best branch of 
the U.S. Army to enter into once they had graduated (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, in press). Data for the military 
samples was examined under a data-sharing agreement between the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis 
of the United States Army and the University of New Hampshire. 
c. c. Test-takers in the sole non-military sample, Sample 6, completed their tests online through MTurk; they each 
received small payments, contingent on their completion of all the questions. Participants in sample 6 were 
permitted to specify a gender other than male or female. Details of this sample can be found in Lortie (2015). 
d. d.The sum of men and women reflects 5 instances for which data was unavailable and 2 participants of sample 6 
who self-identified as “other.” 
e.  
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Further screening. Screening for attentiveness often enhances the quality of survey 
results and their interpretation (DeSimone, Harms, & DeSimone, 2015). We assigned warning 
values to the Infrequency and Repetition scales: Participants earned a warning value on the 
infrequency scale if they endorsed 25% of the least frequently-endorsed alternatives (a random 
pattern), and one on the repetition scale if they answered with a single letter more than 2/3rds of 
the time. Roughly 1% and .5% of the sample, respectively, received warnings on the scales, We 
set caution levels for both scales, assigned to the interval just below the warning level, but still in 
the extreme tails of the distributions. Parallel cut points (using prorating) were set for the second-
half scales. Given the circumstantial evidence that some participants experienced a drop in 
attention, we screened out those with a warning on either scale, or two cautions on any of the 
scales; this excluded 300 (2.8%) of the 10,618 participants.   
Exploratory and Cross-Check Subsamples 
 In the factor and item analyses of the scale, we explored and finalized models in an 
exploratory sample of N = 5,144 odd-numbered participants and then cross-checked them in the 
remaining N = 5,174 even-numbered participants. (More odd- than even numbered participants 
were screened out for attentional drop-off). We split the sample odd-even so as to tie the two 
samples to the original archived data file, to ensure that we represented all samples equally and 
so the split could be readily re-created as needed. 
Addressing the Factor Structure of Personal Intelligence (Hypothesis 2) 
We next turned to whether personal intelligence can be adequately represented either as a 
single overall factor or as two or more highly-correlated factors. To test this hypothesis, we first 
conducted exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses in the exploratory sample and then 
checked the final confirmatory model in the cross-check sample. 
Overview of the TOPI 1.4 factor analyses. For all factor models we evaluated fit with 
reference to acceptance criteria for the CFI and TLI of “close to” .95 or higher, and for the 
RMSEA of “close to” .06 or lower (Boomsma, Hoyle, & Panter, 2012, p. 27; Hu & Bentler, 
1999). TOPI items are dichotomously scored (i.e., correct or incorrect) and so categorical in 
form; we therefore used Mplus’s weighted least squares, mean and variance adjusted estimation 
(WLSMV) as it is particularly appropriate for test items of this (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2015). 
For our exploratory analyses, we used a facparsim rotation, which is especially suitable for 
modeling large numbers of items (Finch, 2011; Sass & Schmitt, 2010). Only delta 
parameterization was available for the exploratory analyses in Mplus version 7.2; our 
confirmatory analyses used WLSMV with theta parameterization because it allowed us to 
compare modification indices for item pairs (the two parameterizations yielded similar models 
and fits). 
Initial exploratory factor analyses. We first compared one, two, and three exploratory 
factor solutions in the exploratory sample. The fit of each solution to the data is reported in the 
top rows of Table 2 labeled “Initial Exploratory Factor Analyses.” The one-factor model fit was 
imperfect with its CFI and TLI closer to .90 than .95. A two-factor solution fit better with CFI = 
.95; TLI = .95, and RMSEA = .01. An examination of the scree plot also suggested a two-factor 
solution. The three-factor solution did fit best, but its third factor appeared to be a “bloated 
specific:” its several items shared wording and came from a single item cluster, rather than 
representing a more broadly meaningful factor.  
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Table 2  
 
Factor Models of the TOPI 1.4: Iterations and Concluding Solutions 
 
 
Model Tested  Item Split  Variables/ 
Free 
parameters 
Fit Indices rfactors 
Chi-2 df RMSEA CFI TLI 
Initial Exploratory Factor Analyses, Odd Sample (N=5,144) 
1- to 3-Factor Solutions Facparsim-Rotated, Oblique 
One factor model na 93/93 9813.11 4185 .016 .907 .905 na 
Two factor model 43/50 93/185 7298.51 4093 .012 .947 .945 r12 = .46 
Three factor model 34/39/20 93 6488.78 4002 .011 .959 .956 rs123 =.35 to .52 
Confirmatory Two Factor Models, Odd Sample (N=5,144) 
Removing Cross-Loading Items (> .25 on both factors) 
Simple structure 80: 40/40 80/161 7127.40 3079 .016 .912 .910 r12 = .79 
Removing Low-Loading Items (< .25) 
Simple structure 72: 36/36 72/145 5354.72 2483 .015 .934 .932 r12 = .80 
Final Factor Model, Odd Sample (N=5,144) 
Removing Items with Poor Pairwise Fit (Large Modification Indices) 
Simple structure 68: 34/34 68/137 4074.63 2209 .013 .952 .950 r12 = .82 
Bifactor Modela  68: 68/34/34 68/204  3408.78 2142 .011 .967 .965 r** = .00 
Configural (Factor) Invariance for Two Factors for Women and Menb 
Men, separately 68: 34/34 68/137 3632.04 2209 .013 .955 .953 r12 = .82 
Women, separately 68: 34/34 68/137 2454.66 2209 .010 .948 .947 r12 = .82 
Combined model 68: 34/34 69/208 5722.63 4484 .011 .962 .962 r12m/f = .82; .81  
Confirmatory Two Factor Models, Even Sample Cross-Check (N = 5,174) 
Simple structure 68: 34/34 68/137 4226.71 2209 .013 .947 .945 r12 = .81 
Bifactor Modela 68: 68/34/34 68/204  3380.06 2142 .011 .967 .965 r** = .00c 
Study 2 Cross Validation Sample (N = 8,459) 
Simple structure 67: 33/34 67/135 5682.48 2143 .014 .957 .956 r12 = .87 
a. The bifactor model employs an overall factor on which all items load, as well as group factors (in this case, two). 
The overall factor and two specific factors are all constrained to be uncorrelated with one another. In the resulting 
model, every item is a product of two independent sources of variance: that due to the overall factor (overall 
personal intelligence, in this instance), and that due to the specific factors. 
b. A test of configural invariance specifically indicates whether the number of factors of the model fit for separate 
groups, in this case, whether it fit equally well for men and women. To carry out the test, the model is first fit to 
groups of women and men separately, and then fit in a combined model including both groups.  
c. As noted in ‘a’ above, the correlation between the two specific factors is constrained to zero in the bifactor 
models. The constraint is useful for estimating the variance accounted for by a general factor relative to the specific 
factors (see text). 
 
Interpreting the factors. We next interpreted the factors by examining the items that 
loaded on them. The first factor included items that asked about: (a) traits that are consistent with 
one another (e.g., liveliness and extraversion), (b) consistencies between an individual’s personal 
goals and behaviors, and (c) a person’s traits and their reactions in a given context, as well as (d) 
perceiving congruency between a person’s behaviors and their motives and traits. We labeled 
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this first factor Consistency-Congruence (CC) personal intelligence because it concerned 
reasoning about consistencies among plans, traits and behaviors.  
The second factor asked questions about (a) understanding the dynamic interplay 
between two or more goals and their possible conflicts, (b) knowing how personal memories can 
motivate (or demotivate) a person, (c) identifying how a given self-perception might promote a 
behavior, and (d) analyzing alternative perceptions of oneself (or another person), and sensibly 
integrating the sometimes contradictory information. We labeled this second factor Dynamic-
Analytic (DA) personal intelligence because it involved reasoning about personality dynamics 
and integrating information. Both factors drew items from all four problem                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
-solving areas represented in the test.  
 Initial test of the two-factor model. We next confirmed the two-factor model, 
constraining each item to load on only a single factor. We first removed 13 items that loaded 
above |.25| on both factors and then tested the model with the remaining 80 items, placing the 
remaining items on the factor on which they had loaded most highly before. The solution fit 
reasonably well, and the two factors correlated with one another r = .79, but the CFI and TLI, at 
around .91, did not meet our expectation (see Table 2 for details). We next removed all items that 
failed to load at least |.25| on their assigned factors, leading to a further slight improvement in fit. 
Finally, we identified five item pairs that exhibited large modification indices and, on that basis, 
dropped four items (one item was in two pairs). The two-factor model fit the remaining 68 items 
with a CFI and TLI of .95, and an RMSEA of .01, which met criteria. 
We also successfully fit a bifactor model to the same 68 items (see Table 2) and used that 
to further check of the scale’s dimensionality. We calculated the amount of variance of each 
factor due to the common personal intelligence factor, termed its explained common variance or 
ECV (Reise et al., 2010). The overall personal intelligence factor accounted for 72% of the 
variance of the first factor and 79% of the second (76% overall). Anything less than 85% is 
regarded as supporting multidimensionality and therefore supported the use of two separate 
factors (O'Connor Quinn, 2014; Stout, 1990).  
Configural invariance (Hypothesis 3). We also checked whether men and women 
exhibited the two-factor structure in their separate groups; they did, as indicated in the factor 
invariance row of Table 2. 
Re-confirmation on the cross-check sample. As a further step, we examined the fit of 
the model in the cross-check sample (N = 5,174). The fit of both the simple structure and bifactor 
models was almost identical to that found in the exploratory sample (Table 2).  
Item Analyses of the Scales  
Having divided the TOPI 1.4 into two related factors, we next conducted item analyses of 
each scale in IRTPRO (Cai, Thissen, & du Toit, 2016). We employed a 2-parameter IRT model 
of the scales that estimated each item’s difficulty level and power of discrimination in the 
exploratory sample. In our analyses of the two scales, there was no advantage of a 3-parameter 
relative to a 2-parameter model, as assessed by the difference in -2loglikelihoods across models, 
where χ2 = -2ll3PL –2ll2PL. For the CC scale, these values were χ2(34) = 141095.85 – 141066.26 = 
29.59, n.s., and for DA, χ2(34) = 169466.07 – 169443.66 = 23, n.s..  
In the results that follow, we corrected significance levels for the number of item 
comparisons using the Benjamini-Hochberg correction (Williams, Jones, & Tukey, 1999).  
General fit. For both scales, all items fit the 2-parameter model adequately according to 
the reasonableness of the parameter estimates and the summed score (S-χ2) item level 
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diagnostics. The initial model fit also was indicated by an RMSEA of .02 and .01 for the 
Consistency-Congruence and Dynamic-Analytic scales.  
Marginal dependence. For the CC scale, 10 item pairs showed substantial local 
dependence (LD-χ2 > 10), and for the DA scale, 13 item pairs, indicating that some item pairs 
shared variance beyond that of the targeted factor. We examined the content of each of those 
item pairs. For the CC scale, nine of the pairs addressed reasonably diverse content; the tenth 
pair, however, employed repetitive wording, and we dropped the weaker of the two items, 
improving the model fit to an RMSEA of .01. The DA scale pairs exhibited no repetitive content 
and we retained all item pairs.  
Item difficulty and discrimination across ability levels. For the two scales, the item 
slopes (a parameters) ranged from .48 to 1.48, with a mean of .84 for CC, and from .39 to 1.70, 
with a mean of .87, respectively for DA. The item difficulty levels (b parameters) for the CC and 
DA scales ranged from -3.85 to -.80 and from -3.93 to .07, with a mean of -1.77 respectively, 
indicating that most test items could be passed by test-takers who are average or above in 
personal intelligence.  
DIF Analysis for Men and Women (Hypothesis 3 redux, applied to the scales). Women 
scored approximately .30 standard deviations above men on the CC scale and .22 higher than 
men on the DA scale overall. Analyses exploring differential item function (DIF) indicated one 
item was significantly harder for women than for men on the CC scale; we retained the item 
because it did not appear to inquire about anything inherently gender-related. On the DA scale, 
five items were harder for women, and another five harder for men. For the most part the gender 
differences emerged among men and women with comparatively low ability-levels in the area, 
and were possibly linked to the gender of the protagonist of the item (gender of the person 
referred to varied across questions); one item difference might have been due to differential 
anger responses for women and men. As the differences in the 10 flagged items cancelled one 
another out, we made no alterations to the scale on this basis.  
Confirmation of findings across samples. The scales exhibited very similar 
characteristics in the cross-check sample compared to the exploratory: for example, the average a 
parameter of the CC scale differed across samples Mdiff = .02, the b parameter Mdiff = -.02. 
Characteristics of the Final Scales 
Scaled scores. We created scaled scores using a T-scale for both the Consistency-
Congruency and Dynamic-Analytic scales based on the cross-check sample; that scaling set the 
M = 50 and S = 10. 
Test and Scale Correlations. The top of Table 3 shows the correlation between the 
Consistency-Congruence and Dynamic-Analytic scales is r = .58 for the cross-check sample. 
(The results for all participants are in the second portion of Table 3). A composite score that 
averages the two scaled scores (CA and DA), referred to as the TOPI 1.4R Total also is reported, 
along with the original TOPI 1.4 total (all 93 items).  
Better discrimination at low levels of performance (Hypothesis 4). Consistent with the 
idea that the scales better discriminated among test-takers at lower levels of performance, 
distributions of test-takers were negatively skewed for both scales (cross-check sample: CC = -
1.51; DA  = -1.26, ps < .001) and standard errors of measurement for the scaled scores were 
smaller for intervals below the mean than above it for both T-scales (cross-check sample for CC: 
SEMbelow = 4.5; SEMabove = 6.3; for DA:  SEMbelow = 4.3; SEMabove = 5.9). 
Scale reliabilities (Hypothesis 5). As implied by all the analyses so far, the two IRT-
based scales and total (averaged) scale all exhibited reasonable reliability under models of both 
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classical test theory and item response theory. Coefficient alpha reliabilities in ranged from .74 to 
.85 in the cross-check sample. The IRT-based marginal reliabilities were somewhat lower at .66 
and .74 because of the weaker discrimination of the scales among higher-ability test-takers (see 
Table3). The middle portion of Table 3 reports the means and standard deviations of the scaled 




Means, Reliabilities, and Correlations for the TOPI 1.4R Consistency-Congruence, Dynamic-Analytic and 
Composite scales 









 Alpha3 Margin. 
(IRT)5 
 Consis. Dyn. Orig. 
TOPI 14 
 Study 1 Cross-Check (Even-Numbered) Sample, N = 5,174 
    Consistency 49.69 (8.08) 49.37 (8.19) 50.85 (7.57)  .74 .66  1.00**   
    Dynamic 49.83 (8.53) 49.56 (8.53) 50.76 (8.49)  .80 .74  .58** 1.00**  
Composite2 49.76 (7.38) 49.46 (7.45) 50.80 (8.49)  .85**4 Not est.6  .88** .90** .96** 
 Study 1 Total Sample, N = 10,318 
     Consistency 49.85 (8.12) 49.47 (8.21) 51.19 (7.64)  .75 .66  1.00**   
     Dynamic 49.92 (8.58) 49.59 (8.61) 51.06 (8.36)  .80 .74  .59** 1.00**  
Composite2 49.88 (7.45) 49.53 (7.52) 51.13 (7.06)  .85**4 Not est.6  .89** .90** .97** 
 Study 2 Total Sample, N = 8,459 
    Consistency 49.47 (8.65) 49.12 (8.78) 50.69 (8.08)  .79 .65  1.00**   
    Dynamic 49.24 (9.01) 48.93 (9.07) 50.30 (8.76)  .82 .74  .64** 1.00**  
Composite2 49.36 (7.99) 49.02 (8.10) 50.49 (7.48)  .88**4 Not est.6  .90** .90**  .97** 
1Men and women number 6843 and 1971 in the cross-check sample, 8049 and 2261 in the Study 1 total sample, and 
6539 and 1920 in the Study 2 Replication Sample. Men and women do not add to the total in Study 1 because in one 
subsample, test-takers could endorse an “other” alternative.  
2Formed from the mean of the scaled scores of the Consistency-Congruency and Dynamic-Analytic factors (see text).  
3Based on standardized items.  
4This estimate is the coefficient alpha on the standardized items of the composite unscaled 67 items; the alpha for the 
combined scaled scores may vary slightly from this value but cannot be directly calculated. 
5The marginal reliabilities are for the scaled scores on the summed scores (SS/SS). The estimates based on the 
response pattern scoring (RPS) were trivially higher. 
6The marginal reliabilities of the simple summed score of two IRT-based scaled scores cannot be estimated.  
 
 
Correlations between Actual Personal Intelligence and Self-Estimated Personal Intelligence 
(Hypothesis 6) 
   We further had hypothesized that the Test of Personal Intelligence measures mental 
ability by drawing on cognitive abilities, distinct from self-judgment. The master data file also 
included scores on the Self-Estimated Personal Intelligence test (SEPI) for 8,866 cases. The 16 
item scale exhibited an alpha reliability of α = .87 and test-to-test correlations with Consistency-
Congruence and Dynamic-Analytic abilities at levels of  r = .24 and .24, with the TOPI Total at r 
= .26, and the original 93 item TOPI 1.4, r = .28, ps < .01, levels that fell slightly higher than our 
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predicted levels. We will revisit the TOPI scales’ validities in Study 3 and the General 
Discussion.   
 
Study 2:  
Cross-Validation in an Independent Sample 
 
In Study 2 we retested the two-factor model and reexamined the scales in an independent, 
archival file of N = 8,814. All data were from the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, 
and delivered between November 2015 to September 2016. These latter test responses were 
scored for the OEMA but otherwise unexamined until late September of 2016, well after the 
analyses for Study 1 were complete. 
Participants 
 Participants in Study 2 were N = 8,814 test-takers from two further classes from West 
Point (Ns = 973 and 1,107) and two further samples of ROTC students from different years (Ns = 
5,512 and 1,222), the latter including only ROTC scholarship students. There were 6,843 men 
and 1,971 women with a mean age of 20.07 and a similar ethnic distribution as before. 
Measures, Procedures, and Screening 
Our measures, procedures, and screening were the same as in Study 1.   
Results  
 Screening. In Study 2, the screening (unchanged from Study 1) resulted in the removal of 
355 test-takers or 4%, a rate similar to but somewhat higher than the 2.8% exclusion rate in 
Study1, leaving N = 8,459.  
 Test of the Two-Factor Model. A test of the two factor simple-structure model on the 
final 67 item scale indicated a similar fit as before of CFI = .96; TLI = .96, and RMSEA = .014. 
In Study 2; the correlation between the two factors rose to r = .87 (from .82 in Study 1) due to a 
slightly greater range of test-taking ability among participants: If we correct the correlation in the 
Study 1 sample for restriction of range relative to Study 2, the r = .86 between factors is almost 
equivalent. The Explained Common Variance continued to indicate the presence of two factors, 
at 83% and 81%, as tested within the context of a bifactor model. In our reexamination of the 
item response analyses, the original model fit well (RMSEAs = .02 and .02) and no 
modifications to the two scales were regarded as necessary. 
 
Study 3. Examining the Correlation of the TOPI 1.4R Scales with 
Selected Criteria: Reanalysis of Mayer, Panter & Caruso, 2012 (Study 3) 
 
To understand more about the Consistency-Congruence and Dynamic-Analytic scales 
developed here (and their composite), we rescored the subset of 67 items of the TOPI 1.2 used in 
Mayer et al. (2012), Study 3, that now form the Consistency-Congruency and Dynamic-Analytic 
scales of the TOPI 1.4R. The earlier Study 3 had been conducted to correlate the TOPI with 
other psychological tests measuring intellectual ability, the big five, and other qualities described 
below. Our two hypotheses in this reanalysis of earlier data were that (a) the two newly formed 
subscales would exhibit reliabilities and correlate with one another approximately as in Studies 1 
and 2 and (b) that the two scales would exhibit differential correlations with at least several 
criterion measures used in the original Study 3.  
Method and Procedure 
We reanalyzed the data involving N = 384 ethnically diverse college students (52.8% 
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women, 47.2% men) who had completed a vocabulary test, measures of the Big Five, a scale of 
psychological mindedness, and a few measures described below.  
The scale items of the TOPI 1.4R all had been included in the TOPI 1.2, and so both 




 Scale Characteristics. The overall reliabilities for the TOPI 1.4R Consistency-Conguence 
and Dynamic-Analytic scales were r = .79 and .82, and .88 for the whole test. The TOPI 1.4R 
composite correlated r = .97 with the complete TOPI 1.2 (Table 3, bottom rows). 
Criterion Correlations. Table 4 also includes the correlations between the two subscales 
and criteria from the earlier study. Both scales and the composite correlate significantly with a 
number of the criterion measures at roughly the same levels as had the TOPI 1.2 in the original 
report. The TOPI 1.4R scales correlate positively with related mental abilities in the r = 37 to .64 
range, ps < .001. They correlate with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness in the Big Five r = 
.12 to .20, with Psychological Mindedness r = .29 and .39, and negatively with symptoms of 
personality disorders r = -.07 to -.22. They show signs of correlating with lifespace data (i.e., 
questions related to specific behavioral interactions and decisions), such that people low in 
personal intelligence exhibited more judgmental reactions to people and less future planning. 
Among these criteria—which were selected to correlate with overall PI and not to 
distinguish between abilities—the Consistency-Congruency and Dynamic-Analytic scales mostly 
performed similarly, although the DA scale correlated more highly with other mental abilities 
than did CC, as indicated in the block of ability measures at the top. Beyond that, there is just a 
hint that CC may be less protective against the manifestations of narcissistic grandiosity given its 
lower (negative) correlation with the scale of that name, and its lower relation to overconfidence 
in judging people, as illustrated by the lifespace item “…discover you were right” about turning 
someone down as a roommate. We further consider the two scales and their possible differences 




Summary of Findings 
Earlier research has supported a view of personal intelligence as a measure of a person-
centered intelligence that correlates with other scales and with performance in school and on-the-
job (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, in press; Mayer et al., 2012). Here, facilitated by a now larger 
sample of test-takers, we examined the ability in more detail than has been done in the past: We 
explored whether there existed subsidiary mental skills that made up personal intelligence, its 
relation to self-judged insight into personality, and the distribution of the ability.  
We found evidence that people can be characterized as employing two closely-related 
abilities to answer questions in the area, Consistency-Congruence and Dynamic-Analytic 
reasoning, and that these were largely unrelated to how smart a test-taker thought she was about 
people, as measured by a self-judgment test of personal intelligence. Other findings included that 
the TOPI 1.4R scales better distinguish among test takers at low rather than high ability levels, 
and that it made sense to add several scales to the TOPI 1.4R to monitor attentive responding. 
 
 






The TOPI 1.4R and Criteria: Reanalysis of Data from Mayer, Caruso & Panter, 2012 (N = 384) 
    
TOPI and Criterion Measures TOPI 14R Factor Scalesa Difference Composite 
 Consistency Dynamic (absolute)a,b Scorea 
TOPI Scales and Other Mental Abilities     
      TOPI-Consistency-Congruence 1.00    
      TOPI-Adaptive-Dynamic  .67** 1.00   
      TOPI 1.4-R Composite .89** .93** .04** 1.00 
      Vocabulary .31** .44** .13** .42**  
       Reading the Mind in the Eyes .37** .50** .13** .49** 
       MSCEIT-Strategic Area .56** .63** .07* .66** 
            Understanding Task .37** .51** .14** .48** 
            Managing Task .54** .64** .10** .65** 
   
Big Five     
    Extraversion -.01 -.06 .05 -.04 
    Neuroticism -.06 -.03 .03 -.05 
    Openness .06 .10 .04 .09* 
    Agreeableness .12* .15** .03 .15** 
    Conscientiousness .19** .16** .03 .20** 
     
Psych Minded-Total .29** .39** .10** .38** 
     Discussing prob. .25** .33** .08* .33** 
     Access feelings .18** .21** .03 .22** 
     Understanding .12* .15** .03 .15** 
     Motivation .24** .29** .05 .29** 
     Open Change .09 .15** .06 .13* 
     
Symptomatology     
     Maladaptive Agreeableness -.14** -.15** .01 -.16** 
     Narcissistic Grandiosity -.13* -.22** .09* -.19** 
     Narcissistic Personality (NPI) -.07 -.13* .08 -.11** 
     
Self-Described Social Skills     
       Initiating relationships .02 -.02 .04 -.06 
       Providing emotional  
       support 
.16** .14** .02 .16** 
       Asserting influence .09 .02 .07 .06 
       Self-disclosure -.00 -.01 .01 -.01 
       Conflict resolution .08 .07 .01 .08 
     
Life Space Questions (“Over the past week…did 
you:”) 
    
a. Watch yourself do something to improve? -.16** -.19** .03 -.19** 
b. Ask for feedback? -.11* -.10   .01 -.12* 
c. Read about role model? -.20** -.23** .03 -.24** 
d. Plan for your future? .12* .15** .03 .15** 
e. Turn down someone to be a roommate and 
discover you were right? 
-.27** -.36** .09* -.35** 
f. Describe someone’s personality in detail in 
an e-mail?  
-.20** -.22** .02 -.23** 
a*p< .05, **p < .01; bsignificance levels are a consequence of both difference and correlation level 




The Two-Factor Model of the Test—And a One-Factor Representation as an Alternative 
Consistency-Congruence and Dynamic-Analytic Reasoning. The two factor model 
divides people’s personal intelligence into Consistency-Congruence and Dynamic-Analytic 
personal intelligence. These factors showed up in exploratory factor analyses of the scale, and 
could be modeled well in confirmatory analyses using a simple correlated factor structure. 
People use their Consistency-Congruence reasoning to think about traits, how traits relate to one 
another, and how they predict people’s actions. People use their Dynamic-Analytic reasoning to 
understand how different parts of personality work together, how sometimes contradictory 
information about personality can be integrated, how different people can perceive one another 
differently, and how to set goals for the future. 
A One Factor Alternative. Although we like the two-factor approach, we freely 
acknowledge that alternative models also fit the data well, especially the legitimacy of a “one 
intelligence” approach to the personal intelligence area, as supported by the bifactor model, and 
that other researchers may prefer it (Reise et al., 2010, p. 554). For that reason, we also have 
calculated a composite scale that takes the average of the Consistency-Congruence and 
Dynamic-Analytic scaled scores, weighing them evenly in the result (to equally represent the 
abilities in the area, as now understood). This TOPI Total Scale may be convenient for use when 
a simple summary variable is needed to represent personal intelligence.  
The correlation between Consistency-Congruence and Dynamic-Analytic personal 
intelligence. Indeed, a complication of the two-factor approach is that the CC and DA scales 
possess an estimated correlation of between r = .81 and .82 in Study 1 to .87 in Study 2 if 
measured with perfect weighting of parameters and perfect reliability. The actual obtained 
correlations between the two scales in our studies ranged from r = .58 to .67. Although the 
estimated values seem high, they fall squarely within the range of similar estimates found for 
correlations among other broad intelligences: MacCann et al. (2014, Table 5) found estimated 
correlations between crystallized and fluid intelligences of r = .87, between verbal and fluid 
intelligence of r = .88, and between verbal intelligence and quantitative reasoning of r = .75; 
Kranzler & Keith (1999) estimated correlations among broad abilities measured by the Cognitive 
Assessment System from r = .61 to .93.  
The Relation between the Four Problem-Solving Areas of Personal Intelligence and the 
Two-Factor Solution.   
Earlier we presented a model of four problem solving areas of personal intelligence: 
identifying information, modeling personality, guiding choices and systematizing goals. We 
regarded those problem-solving areas as likely distinct from the abilities people apply to the 
problem areas: Educators rightly distinguish between fiction and nonfiction when teaching 
literature, but their students use vocabulary skills and sentence comprehension to understand 
both. The situation for personal intelligence is depicted in Figure 1. There, the four problem-
solving areas are indicated across the top, and the two reasoning areas are depicted in arrow-like 
figures that span the problem areas. Consistency-Congruence reasoning, for example, can be 
used to identify trait-related clues in the Identifying Information area, or to select objectives 
consistent with one’s traits in the Systematizing Goals area. By comparison, Dynamic-Analytic 
reasoning can be used to integrate contradictory information about a person’s traits in the 
Identifying Information area, or to ensure one chooses goals that are mutually supportive where 
possible in the realm of Systematizing Plans.  
 






Differential Predictions from the Two Scales.  
The differential prediction of the two factors is as-of-yet mostly unexplored, and limited 
by their approximately r = .85 correlation with one another. That said, Dynamic-Analytic 
reasoning appears more closely related to other intelligences and Consistency-Congruence may 
be more related to other qualities we might speculate about: One possibility is that CC reasoning 
correlates with people’s implicit personality theories about how unchangeable or adaptable 
people are. Carol Dweck and colleagues (Olson & Dweck, 2009; Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009) 
have characterized a portion of the population as applying a fixed mindset to how people behave, 
emphasizing the stable nature of people’s personality; this may relate to abilities assessed by the 
Consistency-Congruence scale. By comparison, others employ a growth-oriented mindset 
emphasize the changing nature of personality, which may in turn be more related to the 
Dynamic-Analytic scale.  
The Fifth Person in the Room (and the Distribution of Personal Intelligence) 
 More people score highly on the TOPI than low—its scores are negatively skewed—and, 
like other tests that examine reasoning about people, it also discriminates more clearly among 
people low in ability than those who are high (e.g., Maul, 2012). It is worth considering this 
distribution of abilities on the test. To use the Dynamic-Analytic scale as an example, the top 
fifth of test takers get between 90%-100% (31 to 34 items) of the questions correct; if this were a 
classroom, they would be the “A” students. The next 30% of test-takers, all still above average, 
correctly answer 79% to 89% of the time (27 to 34 items)—they would be the “B” students. The 
Figure 1: Consistency and Dynamic Personal Intelligences Operate across the Four Problem-Solving 
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following 30%—the roughly third of the sample somewhat below-average, answer correctly 68% 
to 78% of the time (23 to 26 items correct)—most of this group are the “C” students—and we 
could fairly say that although they perform all right, they “don’t seem to get” a good deal about 
themselves and others. Then there is the bottom 20%, who scored between 12% to 65% correct 
(from 4 to about 22 items). The lowest among this group scored below chance levels, perhaps 
from bad luck, and the rest simply couldn’t answer anything (fewer than half a percent were at 
this extreme). Note that these lowest-scoring individuals were apparently still paying attention: 
They avoided the relatively improbable alternatives that are flagged by the Infrequency Index 
(part of the Inattentiveness Warning Scale). The rest of this group struggled between commonly-
endorsed but incorrect answers and the correct answers, performing between 25% to about 65% 
correct.  
Understanding this distribution may afford us some insight into our daily experiences 
with other people. The results indicate that, among a group of any 10 people there will be (on 
average) one who excels at understanding others, 2 more who are very good at it, and 2 others 
who generally “get” other people. Among the 5 remaining people are 3 who are rather slow to 
pick up on the nature of themselves and other people, and two who recognize very little, perhaps 
nothing, about personality and differences in people at all.  Because every fifth person scores 
fewer than 65% correct of questions about personality, we might refer to them as the “fifth 
person in the room.” Their test performance suggests that they are fairly often confused as to 
people’s individual traits and dynamics, and may, for example, mistake shyness for aloofness, 
attribute deceit to innocent forgetfulness, or pointlessly continue to criticize people who react to 
them defensively. They also may be unaware of their deficit: Self-estimated personal intelligence 
exhibited minimal relations with actual ability in Studies 1 and 2, calling to mind, from 
Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, Isabella’s remark that a judge might be “Most ignorant of 
what he’s most assur’d” (Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene 2, line 117). It is possible that a 
person with a lifetime of misunderstanding of personality could feel confusion and frustration, 
which could account for why some low-scoring participants exhibited relatively higher 
symptoms of personality disorders.   
Educational Implications 
One purpose of identifying subsidiary abilities in the personal intelligence areas was to 
better understand how we might help people to increase their knowledge and effective 
performance in these areas. The presence of Consistency-Congruency reasoning argues for 
teaching people about traits, their meanings and variations, as well as their relationships to 
behavioral outcomes. By comparison, the presence of a Dynamic-Analytic ability suggests that 
people might be taught about how different parts of personality affect one another: When a 
person’s goals are consistent or inconsistent, or when motives and goals diverge. We believe that 
most people have sufficient ability in the area to benefit from curricular-based education and 




 There remains much to learn about personal intelligence. From a practical standpoint, it 
may be possible to develop future versions of the Test of Personal Intelligence that measure 
more precisely at the higher end of the ability continuum. In addition, people engage in many 
kinds of problem solving about one another that may be added to the TOPI or tests like it. As 
new kinds of test items are added, new subsidiary abilities in the area may be uncovered. The 
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TOPI represents an advance, however, in that it serves to assess personal intelligence and to 
clarify a test takers’s strengths and weaknesses in the fundamental abilities it measures. 
 We believe that the Test of Personal Intelligence is, in its present form, sufficiently well 
worked out to promote continued exploration regarding the real-life criteria that personal 
intelligence may predict. We believe that it must be very different to be among the roughly half 
of all test takers who appear to understand personality well versus the lower half of test takers 
who appear relatively confused and misdirected when understanding personalities—be it their 
own or another person’s. Surely these differences in understanding oneself and others are likely 
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